Al-Qa'ida's Virtual Crisis by Awan, Akil N. & Al-Lami, Mina
Over the last five years, the ideo-logical conflict that underlies the ‘Global War on Terror’ 
has been conducted almost entirely on 
the Internet’s battlefield. As early as 
2001, prominent jihadist ideologues like 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri, acutely aware of 
their increasingly marginalised status vis-
à-vis the mainstream media as a conse-
quence of ‘the media war on terrorism’,2 
appealed:
 we must get our message across to the 
masses of the nation and break the 
media siege imposed on the jihad move-
ment. This is an independent battle that 
we must launch side by side with the 
military battle.3 
Bemoaning this ‘media siege’, they 
increasingly turned to the Internet, 
which quickly surpassed all other media 
forms in becoming the principal platform 
for the dissemination and mediation of 
the culture and ideology of jihadism.4
Background
The history of jihadism on the web can 
be traced back further still to the early 
1990s, with the Bosnian War (1992–
95) providing the initial impetus and 
raison d’ être for the nascent jihadist 
web presence. As revelations of perva-
sive war crimes committed by Serbian 
forces against Bosniak civilians began to 
emerge, foreign volunteers flocked to 
Bosnia and fought alongside the Bosnian 
army as part of the El-Mujahid Brigades. 
The popular perception of an iniqui-
tous UN arms embargo preventing the 
Bosniaks from defending themselves, 
starkly juxtaposed with the altruistic 
actions of young Muslim men from across 
the globe, perceived as having forsaken 
families, careers and even their lives in 
order to defend their Muslim brethren 
from further Serb atrocities, generated 
immense public support for these ‘Muja-
hideen freedom fighters.’5 The renewed 
vigour of a popularly conceived legiti-
mate defensive jihad necessitated media 
organs that would publicise and convey 
news of the ‘heroic exploits of the Muja-
hideen’ to sympathetic Muslim audi-
ences around the world. Indeed early 
jihadist websites catered specifically to 
this news media need, as epitomised by 
the English language Azzam.com,6 which 
described itself solely as ‘an independent 
media organisation providing authentic 
news and information about Jihad and 
the Foreign Mujahideen everywhere.’7 
The virtual media jihad continued to 
gain momentum throughout the 1990s 
despite the denouement of the Bosnian 
conflict in 1995, as by this time the jihad-
ist media front had simply diverted its 
gaze to the First Chechen War (1994–96) 
and other nascent peripheral conflicts in 
the Muslim world. The developments of 
the jihadist media apparatus during this 
period were truly groundbreaking, with 
independent media groups such as the 
seminal Islamic Media Center (IMC) not 
only producing and distributing online 
material,8 at a time when the Internet 
was still in its infancy,9 but also employ-
ing e-mail distribution lists to dissemi-
nate material to a diffuse but highly 
targeted audience. These pioneering 
developments laid the groundwork for 
the ascendancy of the later media jihad, 
and are recognised and lauded as such 
by contemporary jihadist strategist Abu 
Musab Al-Suri in his Call to Global Islam-
ic Resistance.10 Nevertheless, despite 
being ahead of their time, jihadist media 
websites during this period inevitably 
adhered to a Web 1.0 paradigm, in some 
cases as a result of their avowed limited 
remit of news provision, but principally 
due to technological limitations of the 
time.
The late 1990s also witnessed 
Al-Qa’ida’s first official foray into the 
virtual realm with its now infamous 
Alneda.com, which also sought to provide 
news coverage from Muslim conflict 
zones, but crucially located this report-
age within a broader jihadist ideological 
framework with a conspicuously prosely-
tising bent. To this end, they published 
key statements, communiqués, works, 
and treatises from leading jihadist ideo-
logues, including Osama bin Laden’s infa-
mous twin ‘fatwas’ upon which the new 
global jihad was crucially predicated. 
More insidiously, Alneda.com is also 
believed to have held steganographi-
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cally encrypted operational information 
online, in addition to surreptitiously 
directing trusted members to more clan-
destine websites.12 Concomitantly, this 
evolutionary phase of the jihadist media 
front also witnessed the appropriation 
of early Web 2.0 capabilities, with the 
development of rudimentary online 
forums and blogs, where users not only 
passively consumed online content but 
actively contributed to its creation too. 
Post 9/11
Whilst the 1998 twin terrorist bomb-
ings of US embassies in Dar es Salaam 
and Nairobi focused greater attention 
of security services on the communica-
tive and operational uses of the Inter-
net by Al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups, it 
was only following the momentous 
events of 9/11 that the jihadist media 
presence really became an object of 
intense international scrutiny. Indeed 
Alneda.com, was shut down at least 
three times in 2002 alone due to denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks.13 On each occa-
sion a major news agency had investigat-
ed the website in relation to a story and 
contacted the Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) for comment, who then baulked 
at the prospect of continuing to host 
the ‘terrorist content’ in the new secu-
rity climate.14 Shortly thereafter, Alneda.
com’s subsequent incarnation was then 
famously usurped by American porn-
site owner Jon Messner for five days in 
August 2002 before site administrators 
became aware of what had transpired, 
at which point he replaced the site with 
the slogan ‘Hacked, tracked and now 
owned by the USA’.15 Nevertheless, Alne-
da.com proved remarkably resilient, and 
despite losing its domain name, contin-
ued to operate until at least 2003 as an 
Internet parasite by furtively embedding 
itself deep within the seemingly innocu-
ous sub-directories of multiple oblivi-
ous host websites.16 Messner’s tentative 
successes inspired others to follow suit 
and anti-jihadist cyber-vigilantes and 
amateur sleuths, unfettered by official 
governmental qualms over the infringe-
ment of constitutional guarantees for 
freedoms of speech, and occasionally 
employing illegal methods, emerged in 
the renewed patriotic vigour of the post-
9/11 milieu. Notable amongst these was 
the ‘Internet Haganah’ which, describing 
itself as a ‘global intelligence network 
dedicated to confronting internet activi-
ties by Islamists and their supporters, 
enablers and apologists’,17 employed a 
‘name and shame’ strategy by identify-
ing site hosts and administrators and 
then informing the ISP on the nature of 
the material in question. Jihadist sites 
were often then suspended by their ISPs 
on the basis of unearthed content that 
violated their terms of service, sustained 
lobbying campaigns from other site visi-
tors, or even implied threats of prosecu-
tion for materially aiding and abetting 
terrorists. In other cases, jihadist sites 
were frequently hacked, usurped using 
programmes like ‘Snapback’, or expe-
rienced incessant DoS attacks. In the 
three years since its inception in 2002 
until 2005, the Internet Haganah alone 
claimed to have been responsible for, 
or assisted in, the shutdown of more 
than 600 sites it claims were ‘linked 
to terror’.18 Indeed, so pervasive was 
this sustained assault that it resulted 
in perhaps one of the most enduring 
features of virtual jihadist media, namely 
their almost ephemeral nature. Many 
sites were fleeting and disappeared 
within weeks or months, resurfacing 
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shortly thereafter under different names 
and guises, and with different ISPs. US 
security officials, who had adroitly moni-
tored key websites over prolonged peri-
ods for intelligence purposes, were often 
exasperated by these Internet vigilantes, 
whose reckless actions inevitably drove 
the groups further underground and 
away from surveillance.19
During this period, security servic-
es also began to take an active interest 
in those suspected of running jihadist 
websites and in December 2003, thirty-
one year old British IT support special-
ist, Babar Ahmad, was arrested under 
the UK Terrorism Act 2000 in connection 
with Azzam.com.20 Highlighting the inad-
equacy of existing terrorism legislation 
that was unable to prosecute against an 
inchoate offence of ‘glorifying terrorism’ 
(controversially later remedied with the 
Terrorism Act 2006), he was released six 
days later without charge, albeit after 
allegedly being severely brutalised in 
police custody.21 Nevertheless, the grav-
ity with which governments began to 
view the jihadist media threat warranted 
Ahmad’s re-arrest eight months later, 
following a US extradition request on 
charges of providing material support to 
terrorists and conspiring to kill persons in 
a foreign country.22 In a damning indict-
ment of British justice, as of February 
2009, and still awaiting potential extradi-
tion, Babar Ahmad had been held for over 
four years without trial or charge by Brit-
ish authorities, as the UK Extradition Act 
2003 did not require the US to provide 
prima facie evidence when requesting 
the extradition of UK residents.
The systematic disruption or 
removal of important jihadist websites, 
and the pending prosecution of indi-
viduals responsible for key sites, was so 
successful that websites which appeared 
unscathed by the campaign inevitably 
faced suspicion. For example, the jihad-
ist news provider Jihadunspun.com, had 
been so credible in its stated role that it 
was at one point appearing within the 
top five search results on Google for 
the term ‘jihad’, and included in Google 
News as a bona fide ‘news provider’, 
much to the chagrin of US officials and 
anti-jihadist civic groups.23 Moreover, 
Jihadunspun.com had continued to 
publish content with apparent impunity 
since its inception, and in spite of the 
fact that the site owner was surprisingly 
candid with her own personal details.24 
Consequently, this observation combined 
with the sophisticated and high-end 
production values led some jihadist 
sites, such as Azzam.com and Maktabah 
Al-Ansaar, to cast aspersion on the site’s 
authenticity in 2002, claiming that it was 
a CIA front designed to monitor and even 
entrap potential jihadists.25 
Transition to Web 2.0
The sustained assault on the jihadist 
media front resulted in a climate of anxie-
ty amongst Al-Qa’ida and jihadist website 
administrators, precipitating the reali-
sation that the virtual jihadist presence 
needed to be decentralised in the same 
way that it was becoming physically,26 
such that attacks on any one node would 
not render the entire system defunct. 
Moreover, the change of strategy would 
also need to ensure they would be suffi-
ciently buffered from any potential legal 
ramifications of hosting jihadist content 
in future. The glaringly obvious solution 
to both circumventing culpability vis-à-vis 
online content, and decentralising media 
efforts entailed little more than complet-
ing the transition to Web 2.0, thus dele-
gating responsibility for user-generated 
content to a suitably large and diffuse 
body of anonymous web users instead, 
who would ensure the longevity of the 
message irrespective of attacks on any 
single node. Although Internet access did 
leave a ‘digital signature’ of sorts, issues 
of traceability of users were easily over-
come through various means such as the 
use of anonymous peer-to-peer (P2P) 
networks, ‘anonymising’ software that 
masked a computer’s actual IP address, 
and the use of proxy servers which acted 
as intermediaries between users and 
host servers thus masking users’ iden-
tities. Consequently, employment of 
such methods effectively rendered users 
untraceable and indeed many jihadist 
web forums actively encouraged users 
to employ many of these methods as a 
safety precaution before engaging in any 
potentially incriminating virtual activ-
ity.27
The transition to Web 2.0 precipi-
tated the ascendancy of public and 
semi-public, password-protected forums 
(muntadayat), which implicitly shifted 
the onus of responsibility for content 
from administrators to users. Site admin-
istrators further absolved themselves of 
liability by posting disclaimers such as 
this one from the Al-Hesba forum which, 
somewhat conspicuously on an Arabic 
forum, was offered in English: ‘The post-
ings in the discussion forums do not 
undergo monitoring, and do not neces-
sarily reflect Alhesbah’s views. Alhesbah 
claims no responsibility or liability to third 
party links or images contained within 
users’ posts.’28 The disclaimer from the 
Mujahedon.net forum was even more 
guarded: ’The postings in the discussion 
forums do not undergo monitoring, and 
do not necessarily reflect Mujahedon.
net views. Mujahedon.net claims NO 
responsibility or liability to third party 
links or images contained within users’ 
posts. We do not encourage any kind of 
“terrorism” and we follow Swedish law 
and order  i.e. freedom of speech.’29
For many years a select clique of 
Arabic, password-protected forums 
provided the key arena for jihadist 
media, with important communiqués, 
statements, interviews, books, manuals 
and audiovisual content appearing first 
and (sometimes exclusively) on them. 
In addition to the provision of content, 
forums also served as an important 
communications medium for the global 
cadres of jihad and their wider audi-
ences, which aside from facilitating the 
discussion and dissemination of new 
material, also allowed ‘outreach’ facili-
ties through which the uninitiated were 
able to express discontent and discover 
a channel for its expression.30 Despite 
the presumed egalitarian nature of Web 
2.0 spaces, Jihadist media production on 
key forums was hierarchically organised 
and strictly regulated, with actors (e.g. 
Al-Qa’ida in Iraq – ISI), producers (e.g. 
Al-Furqan), distributors (e.g. Al-Fajr), 
and specific forum posters controlling 
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every stage of the process.31 Thus users 
on these forums were often more akin to 
traditional categories of passive media 
consumers that appeared inimical to the 
revolution in audience roles heralded by 
Web 2.0.
The meteoric rise and growth of 
jihadist forums was also accompanied 
by the rapid adoption of other Web 2.0 
tools that fostered more genuine collab-
oration and participation, including 
file-sharing portals, podcasts, personal 
spaces, social networking sites, virtual 
worlds and the blogosphere. This was 
hardly surprising considering that Web 
2.0 applications increasingly became the 
most popular sites on the Web during 
this period.32 Mainstream file-sharing 
platforms like YouTube.com, which host-
ed jihadist videos, such as statements 
from Al-Qa’ida leaders and IED attacks 
on Coalition forces, were instrumental 
in facilitating the wider dissemination of 
jihadist content, and significantly, outside 
of its traditional ambit too. For example, 
the video beheading of Nick Berg was 
downloaded from Ogrish.com (a popular 
‘gore’ site) a staggering 15 million times 
upon release,33 which granted the mate-
rial a considerably higher publicity profile 
than could have possibly been envisaged 
by either perpetrators or subsequent 
disseminators of the act. Moreover, the 
dissemination of the culture, ideology 
and media of jihadism across communi-
ties on social networking sites like Orkut.
com and Facebook.com, and virtual 
worlds like Second Life was significant in 
that these constituted novel arenas that 
appeared to be beyond the scope of offi-
cial jihadist media organs. Consequently, 
the jihadist message, intended for, or 
only available to, smaller parochial audi-
ences was increasingly granted much 
more diffuse audience penetration.
However, this diffuse dissemination 
of jihadist content across Web 2.0 plat-
forms outside of the ambit of forums, 
was not necessarily welcomed by Jihad-
ist media organs. Indeed, in Septem-
ber of 2006, Al-Boraq Media Institute 
published a detailed policy document 
entitled ‘Media Exuberance’ which 
sought to curtail the unsanctioned and 
‘exuberant’ proliferation and production 
of unattributed jihadist media by free-
lance amateurs, which it felt was divest-
ing key jihadist media organs (As-Sahab, 
Al-Fajr, Global Islamic Media Front etc.) 
of control over production, mediation 
and dissemination of jihadist content. 
The principal concerns appeared to have 
been fears of unpolished and unprofes-
sional content undermining the credibil-
ity of jihadist media and diverting atten-
tion from ‘official’ sources.34 
Growing unease over the popularity 
and apparent ubiquity of jihadist media 
in Web 2.0 arenas, and its putative role 
in processes of radicalisation amongst 
young Western Muslim diasporic audi-
ences,35 caused disproportionate alarm 
amongst not only Western governments 
and security services, but also within the 
media and thus broader society. Often 
with little understanding of the nature 
or function of jihadist content or the role 
of the Internet,36 attempts were made to 
curtail the ‘media exuberance’ of jihad-
ist sympathisers on mainstream Web 
2.0 fora. For example, in 2006 follow-
ing alerts from anti-jihadist groups, USA 
Today investigated some of the ‘jihad-
ist’ communities hosted on the social 
networking website Orkut.com.37 In light 
of this unwanted scrutiny, Google (who 
owned Orkut.com) felt compelled to 
symbolically delete some of the ‘terror-
ism-related content’ alongside a number 
of the more avowedly jihadist commu-
nities hosted there.38 Indicative of the 
floundering uncertainty characteristic of 
this period, in another case from 2006, 
the very same organisation – Google 
– chose not to censor content on its lead-
ing weblog hosting service Blogspot.com, 
after it was accused of hosting several 
sites for actual terrorist groups such as 
Al-Qa’ida in Iraq.39 In the wake of persis-
tent complaints, Google responded by 
maintaining its policy of free expression, 
accepting that some of their blogs may 
be unpopular or deemed offensive and 
instead posted disclaimers and warnings 
before flagged blogs that read: ‘Some 
readers of this blog have contacted 
Google because they believe this blog’s 
content is hateful. In general, Google 
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does not review nor do we endorse the 
content of this or any blog.’40
Lieberman Campaign
The most high profile campaign to curtail 
the activities of jihadist media on main-
stream Web 2.0 fora emerged in May of 
2008, when US Senator Joseph Lieber-
man wrote to Google urging them to 
‘immediately remove content produced 
by Islamist terrorist organizations from 
YouTube’, which he suggested Al-Qa’ida 
and ‘Islamist terrorist organizations use 
to disseminate their propaganda, enlist 
followers, and provide weapons training 
– activities that are all essential to terror-
ist activity’.41 His lobbying campaign was 
predominantly based upon the find-
ings of the 2008 report ‘Violent Islamist 
Extremism, the Internet, and the Home-
grown Terrorist Threat’ by the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, which he himself 
chaired.42 He further pressed, ‘this 
should be a straightforward task since 
so many of the Islamist terrorist organi-
zations brand their material with logos 
or icons identifying their provenance. In 
addition, please explain what changes 
Google plans to make to the YouTube 
community guidelines to address violent 
extremist material and how Google plans 
to enforce those guidelines to prevent 
the content from reappearing’. Google 
initially refused to honour Lieberman’s 
request of removing all such material, 
defending the decision on their blog: 
‘While we respect and understand his 
views, YouTube encourages free speech 
and defends everyone’s right to express 
unpopular points of view. We believe 
that YouTube is a richer and more rele-
vant platform for users precisely because 
it hosts a diverse range of views, and 
rather than stifle debate, we allow our 
users to view all acceptable content and 
make up their own minds.’43 However, 
this statement was somewhat prema-
ture as Google appeared to acquiesce 
to Lieberman’s relentless lobbying only 
four months later,44 with the announce-
ment that YouTube had in fact revised 
its community guidelines to dissuade 
the uploading of material that would fall 
under Lieberman’s new ‘potentially radi-
calising’ terrorist rubric.45 While many 
videos advocating or depicting violence 
were removed, and a number of users 
with usernames explicitly lionising jihad 
or jihadist leaders had their accounts 
suspended,46 most jihadist videos which 
did not contain ‘violent or hate speech 
content’ were not removed as they did 
not violate community guidelines. 
Forum Closures
Despite this new security environment in 
which growing concerns over virtual radi-
calisation and recruitment came to the 
fore, jihadist forums continued to oper-
ate, at least superficially, with apparent 
impunity. Behind the scenes however, 
the innate nature and liability disclaim-
ers of jihadist forums, which provided 
some protection from potential incrimi-
nation, failed to furnish immunity from 
the ongoing anti-jihadist web assault. 
Consequently the roster of top forums 
used by Al-Qa’ida changed on a regular 
basis, subject to site closures, transfers 
and hacking attempts. Nevertheless, as 
a genre, jihadist forums survived and 
continued to wholly dominate the virtu-
al jihadist landscape. In fact, the stark 
juxtaposition of the jihadists’ success 
in propounding their narrative, and 
the dismal failure of the Global War on 
Terror to either silence or counter this 
message, engendered an aura of invin-
cibility around these forums. In terms of 
propagandistic value alone, they became 
the bane of governments everywhere, 
and apparently little could be done to 
mitigate their effects. However, contrary 
to all expectations, the jihadist forums 
suffered a momentous reversal on 10 
September 2008, when, without warn-
ing, the three main forums sponsored 
by Al-Fajr Media Centre (Al-Qa’ida’s 
key media wing), Al-Ikhlaas, Al-Firdaws, 
and Al-Buraq, suddenly ceased to oper-
ate. The immediate antecedent to the 
forums’ disruption appeared to have 
been the imminent release of Al-Qa’ida’s 
latest video production by As-Sahab, 
‘Result of Seven Years of Crusades’, 
which was designed to coincide with the 
commemorations of 9/11 and had been 
eagerly anticipated on jihadist forums. 
The wave of unprecedented closures 
may also have been linked to the arrest 
of five key individuals on the same day 
by the Saudi Ministry of Interior for 
propagating terrorist thought over the 
Internet, using numerous pseudonyms 
and accounts to promote and dissemi-
nate Al-Qa’ida’s ideas on multiple jihad-
ist forums.47 It is entirely feasible that 
these individuals were key forum admin-
istrators whose physical incarceration 
not only spelt the end of their virtual 
personas, but also the ability to resur-
rect the forums for which they were 
responsible. Whilst a statement from the 
Al-Fajr Media Centre rushed to assure its 
followers that the downing of the three 
sites was due to ‘technical problems’, 
members on other forums fulminated 
against the ‘vicious attack’, which they 
claimed originated variously with the 
‘Anglo-Americans, Zionist-Crusaders or 
Saudis’.48 One prominent article posted 
on numerous forums, entitled ‘The film 
that downed the three sites’ suggested 
that: ‘While 9/11 2008 seemed to be a 
quiet and normal day to many, there was 
turmoil behind the scenes. CIA agents 
and Al-Fajr experts engaged in one of the 
fiercest electronic battles in the history 
of cyberwar’.49 Moreover, it suggested 
the attack had been prompted by the 
release of the video to the CIA from Al-
Jazeera, who had been sent a copy ahead 
of its release in the expectation that they 
would broadcast the video in full.50
Despite the setback, the delayed 
video did eventually surface on other 
forums and file-sharing platforms 
(including YouTube), albeit after the 
all important commemorative date of 
9/11 had passed. While this strategic 
blow to Al-Qa’ida’s media capabilities 
was widely lauded, it was not accompa-
nied by attendant claims of responsibil-
ity. Consequently, speculation was rife 
over who might be responsible, with a 
number of potential culprits including 
state bodies (mainly USA, UK, Israel and 
Saudi Arabia), counter-terrorism groups, 
anti-jihadist vigilantes, Shia groups, and 
even Al-Qa’ida itself, who, it was suggest-
ed, felt that their media was proving far 
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too revelatory in terms of intelligence 
information. 
The disruption of these three key 
forums severely curbed the Jihadists’ 
communication and dissemination capa-
bilities, leaving only the veteran Al-Hesba 
forum to maintain Al-Qa’ida’s official web 
presence. However, Al-Hesba, one of the 
earliest and by far most credible jihadist 
forums, proved incapable of absorbing 
the influx of virtual refugees from the 
closed forums, particularly as its strict 
security measures would only grant 
membership upon recommendation 
from a credible current member. Other 
less popular forums, such as Al-Faloja, 
and Shumook Al-Islam51 attempted to fill 
the void by accepting the mass of virtual 
jihadist refugees, and consequently, both 
grew considerably in popularity and stat-
ure in subsequent weeks. Despite the 
availability of these alternative platforms, 
forum members were cognisant of the 
fact that jihadist media itself was now 
facing its gravest existential threat, and 
that lesser forums would inevitably be 
targeted next. Rather than meekly await 
the inevitable, they turned their atten-
tion to proactively countering the assault 
instead, and with the motto ‘today your 
sites, tomorrow your lands and homes’, 
ad hoc groups like the Internet Invasion 
Brigade of Al-Maghreb and Al-Nusra 
Media Brigade were formed specifically 
to engage in a virtual counter-initiative. 
This info-war would be conducted princi-
pally along three fronts:
 1) by disseminating jihadist content 
through Web 2.0 file-sharing portals 
(focusing on uncensored sites like 
Megavideo.com, and Tubemogul.
com, following YouTube’s increasing 
censorship of jihadist content);
 2) by identifying and invading sites 
in order to spread the jihadist ideol-
ogy, with a particular focus on 
moderate Arabic forums and popu-
lar social networking sites like Face-
book;
 3) by hacking ‘Western’ sites.
However, whilst these plans were 
being formulated, more jihadist forums 
suffered closure and by late November 
2008 Al-Hesba, Shumookh Al-Islam, 
Hanein and the English site Infovlad.net 
were also rendered offline. The only cred-
ible jihadist forum still extant was now 
Al-Faloja, which quickly became oversat-
urated with new members and material. 
Still reeling from the loss of their virtual 
sanctuary and anticipating the imminent 
closure of Al-Faloja, members frantically 
searched for viable alternatives.
Facebook
The most popular solution propounded 
was the ‘Invasion of Facebook’ project, 
with key members stating, ‘we shall start 
using Facebook as a new jihadi media tool 
and to counter the ongoing cyber-attack 
on jihadi websites. Through posting our 
productions and news on Facebook, we 
will be able to reach the American public 
opinion and make it see the facts its 
administration is trying so hard to hide’.52 
The campaign stressed its unique advan-
tages as an effective networking tool of 
global reach, illustrating this point with 
reference to Barack Obama’s prolific use 
of Facebook during his successful elec-
tion campaign. Members advocating 
this strategy argued that it was entirely 
inconceivable that intelligence agencies 
could close Facebook, and in the event of 
specific Facebook group closures, would 
simply persist in constantly creating new 
groups and new accounts, in addition to 
invading other non-jihadist groups. The 
purpose of creating a group on Facebook, 
suggested one member on Al-Faloja, ‘is 
not to introduce jihadi forum members 
to Facebook, but to introduce Facebook 
users to jihadi forums’.
The Facebook appeal received 
widespread support on Al-Faloja, with 
prominent animated advertisements 
and banners which read ‘Al-Faloja forum 
invites you to invade Facebook’, publicis-
ing the campaign. In a prescient move, 
senior members filled with a sense of 
foreboding asked fellow members to 
‘quickly subscribe to Facebook before all 
our forums are hacked’, and on 12 Decem-
ber 2008, the plan finally came to fruition 
with the establishment of the Facebook 
group ‘Knights of Al-Nusra Invasion’.53 
Barely a week later, on 19 December, al-
Faloja joined the growing list of closed 
jihadist forums. However, by this time 
the Facebook group membership had 
proliferated (with many members joining 
under their familiar nom de guerres from 
jihadist forums), and the group provided 
an effective functional alternative within 
this otherwise censored environment. 
However, the tentative success of Knights 
of Al-Nusra Invasion was to be short-
lived, and on 20 December, the burgeon-
ing Facebook group itself was closed, 
leaving supporters completely bereft 
of exclusively jihadist virtual arenas. 
However, in a rapidly changing environ-
ment, Shumookh Al-Islam reopened on 
the same day, and was followed a few 
days later by the reinstatement of Al-
Faloja on 23 December 2008. Neverthe-
less, as of January 2009, the four key 
jihadist forums – Al-Ikhlaas, Al-Firdaws, 
Al-Buraq and Al-Hesba – remain closed 
in the gravest indication of the future of 
Al-Qa’ida’s official presence on the web.
Conclusion
Whether or not jihadist forums can re-
emerge remains to be seen, however, 
even if they were to be resurrected or 
replaced in the immediate future, it 
could not remove the tarnished image 
of the impotent and fickle nature of a 
beleaguered movement. Conversely, 
the sustained assault on jihadist forums 
has not resulted in a jihadist informa-
tion blackout that many security serv-
ices naively anticipated, and jihadism, 
albeit in somewhat attenuated form, 
has survived and indeed spread unim-
peded across other Web 2.0 platforms. 
Naturally, this diffuse web penetration 
has displayed some limitations, particu-
larly as other Web 2.0 fora are unable 
to competently fulfil all of the functions 
served by forums. For example, popular 
file-sharing platforms cannot cater for 
non audiovisual content,54 or serve as a 
communications medium. Moreover, the 
media environment provided by these 
platforms impose their own restrictions 
and censorship, and so while Youtube 
continues to host propagandistic films 
like As-Sahab’s ‘The Power of Truth’ and 
‘Result of Seven Years of Crusades’,55 it 
nevertheless actively deletes graphic 
violence such as beheading videos or 
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footage of ‘Juba the Sniper’. Perhaps of 
greater concern to jihadists has been 
the evolution of a far less controlled and 
non-hierarchical media environment, in 
which the role of jihadist authorities in 
setting the agenda amongst supporters 
and framing the ‘jihad’ is contested, and 
ultimately threatens to divest Al-Qa’ida 
leadership of all but a perfunctory spir-
itual role. 
Ironically, this unheralded and 
unprecedented disruption of jihadist 
media may in fact make individuals more 
susceptible to radicalisation (at least in 
the short term), as divesting potential 
jihadists of both cathartic spaces to vent 
grievances and frustration,56 and remov-
ing online fora in which to conduct ‘media 
or information Jihad’, may lead to a resort 
to actual physical violence and terrorism. 
For example, a posting on Shumookh Al-
Islam (following its reinstatement on 20 
December 2008) lamented, ‘with the 
closure of all our sites, you [the Crusad-
ers and their agents] have left us with no 
choice but to physically join the caravan 
of jihad. With no jihadi sites through 
which we can support our brother Muja-
hideen, there is no point for us to stay 
behind. We shall join them. Your act has 
shamed us and caused us to think “what 
is left for us?”’ One of the previous 
perennial debates on jihadist forums had 
focused on the status of those who fail to 
physically engage in the jihad. Such indi-
viduals had, in the past, been shamed 
for remaining behind and limiting their 
contribution to words rather than deeds. 
However, the rise of the ‘media jihad’ 
legitimised this choice, and media jihad-
ists gained a modicum of respectability. 
However, in the absence of this arena, it 
seems inevitable that more virtual and 
media jihadists may feel compelled to 
relinquish their virtual personas in favour 
of real-life jihadist operations. 
It is difficult to foresee the long-
term effects of this sustained assault 
in such a rapidly shifting environment, 
however it would be eminently impru-
dent and premature to characterise 
this episode as the tolling of the death 
knell for jihadist media. Jihadist media 
have shown remarkable resilience in 
the past, in their ability to utilise new 
technological innovations, to adapt to 
the restrictive measures increasingly 
imposed upon them, and to continue 
to operate with apparent impunity in a 
hostile socio-political context. Although 
jihadist media is indeed facing its grav-
est existential threat to date, the crisis 
is liable to simply expedite the evolu-
tion of jihadist media that is already 
well underway. This evolutionary phase 
is witness to the inexorable transition 
from strictly regulated, hierarchical 
media provision in exclusively jihadist 
virtual arenas (which stifled debate and 
proverbially preached to the converted), 
to decentralised, autonomous, diffuse 
media production and dissemination 
over unregulated, and easily contested 
Web 2.0 platforms, to multifarious audi-
ences outside of the traditional jihadist 
ambit. Moreover, this trend parallels 
the evolution of the jihadist movement 
itself, which has metastasized across the 
globe as a social phenomenon – crucially 
amongst a younger, unaffiliated, and 
increasingly diasporic demographic for 
whom Al-Qa’ida represents little more 
than a motif. 
The jihadists’ goal, ultimately, is to 
communicate a meta-narrative – a prism 
through which they require the Muslim 
masses to view contemporary conflicts 
as part of a wider global attack on Islam, 
by what they perceive to be the Zion-
ist-Crusader alliance, in response to 
which they claim to serve as the crucial 
vanguard. The unsanctioned and exuber-
ant proliferation of jihadist media over 
diffuse Web 2.0 fora by autonomous 
individuals may serve to divest Al-Qa’da 
of control of the message. But the over-
arching narrative is so alluringly simple, 
and so germane to current events, that 
its self-perpetuation is assured, so long 
as ‘Islamic’ conflicts remain unresolved 
and Muslim grievances persist. ■
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